2003-01-06 09:39:28尚未設定
Neither Common Form nor Correspondence (2.2)
*** This is my latest project about Deleuze and Guattari. I hope you will ENJOY it.
*** Welcome any comments.
When Deleuze and Guattari call into question this dialectical solution, they are abandoning ideology critique along with its communicational nemesis. Why throw out baby-ideology with the dirty communicative bathwater? If you choose to abstain from both communication and ideology, what's left? Not ' postmodernism ' . From a Deleuze-Guattarian perspective these three approaches, for all their differences, have too much in common philosophically. What they share is an attachment to a concept of determination predicated, in one way or another, despite any protestations to the contrary, on conformity and correspondence.
Traditionally, for communicational purposes, expression is anchored to a ' content '. The content is viewed as having an objective existence prior and exterior to the form of expression. The assumed solidity of the content transfers, across the mirror-like correspondence or moulded conformity, into a trustworthiness of the subjective expression. Moulded, mirroring, expression fathfully conveys content: re-presents it at a subjective distance. This enables communication, understood as a faithful exchange of contents transmitted at a convenient distance from their objective emplacement. In this model, content is the beginning and of communicative expression: at once its external cause and its guarantee of validity. This causal guarantee is crucial, because the subjective distancing upon which communication is predicated enables deception no less than exchange. If ther were no common form or correspondence, who could say? And what? Anyone, anything--out of control. The ' postmodern ' is an image of communication out of control. Seeming to have lost its mooring in objective conformity or correspondence, it appears uncaused, unmotivated, in endless, unguaranteed ' slippage '.
One of the reasons Deleuze and Guattari find the basic communicational model questionable is that it assumes a world of already-definded things for the mirroring. Expression's potential is straight-jacketed by this pre-definition. In Logic of Sense (1990), Deleuze confronts the ' propositional ' view of language underpinning this model, arguing that it allows three fundamental operations, none of which are up to the measure of expression's potential: a three-sleeved straight-jacket. The first cuff,' Designation ', concerns the faithfulness of the expression to the particular state of things with which it is in conformity or to which it corresponds: its objectivity. ' Manifestation ' is the subjective correlate of designation. It pertains to the personal desires and beliefs owned up to by the designating ' I '. ' Signification ' is founded on the capacity of designation to apply beyond particulars to kinds, in other words to geniral ideas and their implications: ' it is a question of the relation of the word to universal or general concepts, and of syntactic connections to the implications of the concept '. If designation concerns the true and the false, signification concerns the ' conditions' of truth and falsehood: ' the aggregate of conditions under which the proposition ' would be ' true '. ' The condition of truth ', it must be noted, ' is not opposed to the false, but to the absurd ' ( Deleuze,1990:14-15)
*** Welcome any comments.
When Deleuze and Guattari call into question this dialectical solution, they are abandoning ideology critique along with its communicational nemesis. Why throw out baby-ideology with the dirty communicative bathwater? If you choose to abstain from both communication and ideology, what's left? Not ' postmodernism ' . From a Deleuze-Guattarian perspective these three approaches, for all their differences, have too much in common philosophically. What they share is an attachment to a concept of determination predicated, in one way or another, despite any protestations to the contrary, on conformity and correspondence.
Traditionally, for communicational purposes, expression is anchored to a ' content '. The content is viewed as having an objective existence prior and exterior to the form of expression. The assumed solidity of the content transfers, across the mirror-like correspondence or moulded conformity, into a trustworthiness of the subjective expression. Moulded, mirroring, expression fathfully conveys content: re-presents it at a subjective distance. This enables communication, understood as a faithful exchange of contents transmitted at a convenient distance from their objective emplacement. In this model, content is the beginning and of communicative expression: at once its external cause and its guarantee of validity. This causal guarantee is crucial, because the subjective distancing upon which communication is predicated enables deception no less than exchange. If ther were no common form or correspondence, who could say? And what? Anyone, anything--out of control. The ' postmodern ' is an image of communication out of control. Seeming to have lost its mooring in objective conformity or correspondence, it appears uncaused, unmotivated, in endless, unguaranteed ' slippage '.
One of the reasons Deleuze and Guattari find the basic communicational model questionable is that it assumes a world of already-definded things for the mirroring. Expression's potential is straight-jacketed by this pre-definition. In Logic of Sense (1990), Deleuze confronts the ' propositional ' view of language underpinning this model, arguing that it allows three fundamental operations, none of which are up to the measure of expression's potential: a three-sleeved straight-jacket. The first cuff,' Designation ', concerns the faithfulness of the expression to the particular state of things with which it is in conformity or to which it corresponds: its objectivity. ' Manifestation ' is the subjective correlate of designation. It pertains to the personal desires and beliefs owned up to by the designating ' I '. ' Signification ' is founded on the capacity of designation to apply beyond particulars to kinds, in other words to geniral ideas and their implications: ' it is a question of the relation of the word to universal or general concepts, and of syntactic connections to the implications of the concept '. If designation concerns the true and the false, signification concerns the ' conditions' of truth and falsehood: ' the aggregate of conditions under which the proposition ' would be ' true '. ' The condition of truth ', it must be noted, ' is not opposed to the false, but to the absurd ' ( Deleuze,1990:14-15)