＊ 聯合新聞網／綜合報導 2010/12/05

維基解密公開的美國外交密電顯示，Google之前被駭，與中共中央政治局常務委員會委員李長春及和周永康有關（中央總書記即胡錦濤）。

一封由美國大使館於2009年5月18日發給華府的密電，引述「熟知情況」的消息人士之言說，某位中國高層在「Google」了自己名字後，發現負面評語，當即決心整肅Google。

密電中未指明誰是「高層」，紐約時報報導，這位高層就是李長春。李長春在Google發現批評他（與同僚）的文章，因此加強施壓Google，並對Google展開商業懲罰。

今年初，發生中國駭客攻擊Google，入侵美國人權人士的e-mail帳號事件。維基解密的另外一份文件顯示，中國駭客攻擊是在李長春及周永康直接負責下進行的。周永康時任中共政法委書記。


維基解密創始人談中國
＊ 美國之音中文網／記者申華 2010/12/05

國際社會目前密切關注的維基解密（WikiLeaks）新聞事件，在中國和阿拉伯世界談論不多。不過，這家網站創始人阿桑奇（Julian Paul Assange）不斷談及中國。

中國：不要相信

美國等西方國家政府密集處理維基解密事件及其效應之際，中國官方日前就維基解密問題發表簡短評論。法新社援引中國外交部發言人姜瑜星期四的話稱，維基解密公佈的某些涉及中國的美國外交電報內容「無法令人置信」。不過她拒絕就所涉及的具體內容加以評論，外交部另外一位發言人洪磊先前也發表了類似的評論。

法新社說，維基解密目前公佈的部分內容顯示：中國對北韓非法出口導彈零部件「置若罔聞」；中國高層曾下令對Google發動網上攻擊；另外，有中國官員稱，中國的盟友北韓是「一個慣壞了的孩子」等等。

中國封網

中國在維基解密事件最近涉及中國後，很快在境內網際網路上通過「長城防火牆」封鎖了這家境外網站。華盛頓郵報說，維基解密公佈的美國外交電報資訊，在中國和阿拉伯世界沒有受眾。北美中文世界日報說，凡是在中國想連接維基解密網站，得到的通知都是「重新啟動」。中國環球時報暗示，維基解密網是「顛覆」中國陰謀的組成部分。

阿桑奇談中國

報導顯示，維基解密網站創始人阿桑奇繼續關注中國，他在接受時代週刊採訪時說，希望以揭露美國的方式，揭露中國和俄羅斯的「秘密」。不過他認為，最封閉的社會，其改革潛力最大，也就是說，中國要比美國更容易改革。阿桑奇還說，中國政府和公安看來懼怕言論自由，而這正是一個樂觀的跡象，說明政治言論依然能夠在中國引起變革。

評說維基解密

朱欣欣是獨立中文筆會成員，原河北人民廣播電台新聞部編輯。他說，在中國只有通過翻墻軟體才能登入維基解密網站，談到這家網站積極作用時，他對美國之音說：「這是肯定的，一方面對掌權者和執政當局，這對他們是個壓力。另外對公民社會的民眾，也是一個很大的幫助。因為它能進一步認清，北京的一些決策過程，以及決策者們的一些真實想法，這樣我們也能採取一些相應的對策。」

朱欣欣還說，維基解密公佈的資訊所涉及的不是針對公民個人：「維基解密所揭密的資訊都是針對強勢集團，不是針對公民個人的，主要針對的是掌權者、位高權重的人、一些執政者。對他們這些人來說，應該讓他們有所忌憚，有所顧忌，否則他們的權力很容易侵犯到公民，應該對他們有個約束」。

中國版揭密網

富比士北京記者站負責人加迪‧愛波斯坦在他的博客上說，一批中國人權活動人士計劃明年六月一號建立開通一個中國版的維基解密網站，不過阿桑奇似乎表示異議，認為「此舉非常危險」，希望中國人權活動人士，能和維基解密網站合作。因為他希望更多能講中文的人和他們獻身合作，因為只有他們的網站具有可信賴的聲譽。

靜觀中國後續動作

與此同時，所謂「維基風暴」正在國際上發酵。各相關國家外交官「心驚肉跳」。世界日報說，不少中國官員「人心惶惶」，還有中國官員擔心丟掉烏紗帽，送去進大牢。

目前各方拭目以待的是，維基解密如果安然渡過眼下風暴後，是否像其宣稱的那樣，公佈7倍於目前資訊量的美國國防部文件。


The dangers of a rising China
Dec 2nd 2010 | ECONOMIST

China and America are bound to be rivals, but they do not have to be antagonists

TOWARDS the end of 2003 and early in 2004 China’s most senior leaders put aside the routine of governing 1.3 billion people to spend a couple of afternoons studying the rise of great powers. You can imagine history’s grim inventory of war and destruction being laid out before them as they examined how, from the 15th century, empires and upstarts had often fought for supremacy. And you can imagine them moving on to the real subject of their inquiry: whether China will be able to take its place at the top without anyone resorting to arms.

In many ways China has made efforts to try to reassure an anxious world. It has repeatedly promised that it means only peace. It has spent freely on aid and investment, settled border disputes with its neighbours and rolled up its sleeves in UN peacekeeping forces and international organisations. When North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month China did at least try to create a framework to rein in its neighbour.

But reasonable China sometimes gives way to aggressive China. In March, when the North sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, China failed to issue any condemnation. A few months later it fell out with Japan over some Chinese fishermen, arrested for ramming Japanese coastguard vessels around some disputed islands—and then it locked up some Japanese businessmen and withheld exports of rare earths vital for Japanese industry. And it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to sovereignty over virtually the entire South China Sea.

As the Chinese leaders’ history lesson will have told them, the relationship that determines whether the world is at peace or at war is that between pairs of great powers. Sometimes, as with Britain and America, it goes well. Sometimes, as between Britain and Germany, it does not.

So far, things have gone remarkably well between America and China. While China has devoted itself to economic growth, American security has focused on Islamic terrorism and war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two mistrust each other. China sees America as a waning power that will eventually seek to block its own rise. And America worries about how Chinese nationalism, fuelled by rediscovered economic and military might, will express itself (see ECONOMIST’s special report).

The Peloponnesian pessimists
Pessimists believe China and America are condemned to be rivals. The countries’ visions of the good society are very different. And, as China’s power grows, so will its determination to get its way and to do things in the world. America, by contrast, will inevitably balk at surrendering its pre-eminence.

They are probably right about Chinese ambitions. Yet China need not be an enemy. Unlike the Soviet Union, it is no longer in the business of exporting its ideology. Unlike the 19th-century European powers, it is not looking to amass new colonies. And China and America have a lot in common. Both benefit from globalisation and from open markets where they buy raw materials and sell their exports. Both want a broadly stable world in which nuclear weapons do not spread and rogue states, like Iran and North Korea, have little scope to cause mayhem. Both would lose incalculably from war.

The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one. The danger is that spats and rows will sour relations between China and America, just as the friendship between Germany and Britain crumbled in the decades before the first world war. It is already happening in defence. Feeling threatened by American naval power, China has been modernising its missiles, submarines, radar, cyber-warfare and anti-satellite weapons. Now America feels on its mettle. Recent Pentagon assessments of China’s military strength warn of the threat to Taiwan and American bases and to aircraft-carriers near the Chinese coast. The US Navy has begun to deploy more forces in the Pacific. Feeling threatened anew, China may respond. Even if neither America nor China intended harm—if they wanted only to ensure their own security—each could nevertheless see the other as a growing threat.

Some would say the solution is for America to turn its back on military rivalry. But a weaker America would lead to chronic insecurity in East Asia and thus threaten the peaceful conduct of trade and commerce on which America’s prosperity depends. America therefore needs to be strong enough to guarantee the seas and protect Taiwan from Chinese attack.

How to take down the Great Wall
History shows that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising power believes it can rise unhindered and the incumbent power believes that the way it runs the world is not fundamentally threatened. So a military build-up needs to be accompanied by a build-up of trust.

There are lots of ways to build trust in Asia. One would be to help ensure that disputes and misunderstandings do not get out of hand. China should thus be more open about its military doctrine—about its nuclear posture, its aircraft-carriers and missile programme. Likewise, America and China need rules for disputes including North Korea (see article), Taiwan, space and cyber-warfare. And Asia as a whole needs agreements to help prevent every collision at sea from becoming a trial of strength.

America and China should try to work multilaterally. Instead of today’s confusion of competing venues, Asia needs a single regional security forum, such as the East Asia Summit, where it can do business. Asian countries could also collaborate more in confidence-boosting non-traditional security, such as health, environmental protection, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism, where threats by their nature cross borders.

If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order it promotes, it needs to stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks them—by, for instance, protectionism—it feeds China’s suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks.

China and America have one advantage over history’s great-power pairings: they saw the 20th century go disastrously wrong. It is up to them to ensure that the 21st is different.