2008-01-28 12:00:32鮪魚
2007 最優避險基金
[2008.1.28]
收錄了爆掉的 case, 也要收錄在distribution 右邊的幸運兒們的個案。John Paulson 的 Paulson & Co. 恐怕是2007 全世界金融市場心情&薪情最好的人了, 在投資銀行界高盛能躲過次貸風暴賺錢 11b, 執行長因而可以分紅 7000萬美金以上, 已經是相當可觀的金額; 但比之於 J.P. 這小子可就遜色了。Paulson 的避險基金獲利 12b 約大於高盛, 但年終是 4b USD, 可是布蘭克芬的 5.3x。充分顯示出替人工作與自己當老闆的差別, 還有避險基金績效獎金分紅的威力 ^^
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投資大師保森 連葛老都加入他公司
【聯合晚報╱編譯彭淮棟/綜合報導】 2008.01.16 03:15 pm
美國次級房貸危機令各地投資者損失慘重，但53歲的避險基金高手保森卻能夠在2006年洞燭機先，看淡美國房市，看壞次級房貸，集資十億美元成立基金押注次貸資產和證券大跌，結果在2007年爆發的次貸風雲和信用危機中大發利市，「保森公司」進帳120億美元，他個人入袋40億美元 (台幣1228億元)，創下華爾街投資人最高年入紀錄，就連前聯準會主席葛林斯班也加入他的公司，因此他堪稱是金融市場中的「新索羅斯」。
保森公司從一個中等評級業者變成今天全球最大的避險基金管理公司之一，而且乘勝追擊，15日宣布，葛林斯班加盟他的避險基金管理公司，葛老要以他的老練經歷，為公司的套利絕招加持，成為15日華爾街要聞。葛老加盟為顧問委員會一員，職責是就可能影響金融市場的問題，為保森的投資管理團隊提供建言。
保森聲明說：「預期經濟方向並評估美國經濟衰退的可能性和嚴重性，對建構投資策略有根本重要性。葛林斯班博士擔任美國聯邦準備理事會主席18年，經歷多次市場循環，使他有獨特眼光來協助我們的投資管理團隊做關鍵性的決定。」
保森公司2006年成立「保森第一信用機會」基金，大買「信用違約交換」 (CDS)。CDS是一種衍生性金融商品，債權人透過CDS，把債務風險賣給他人，有如為債務買保險，CDS契約價格就是「保費」，一旦債務償還出現問題，保費即快速上漲。美國次貸風暴和國際信用危機在2007年滾雪球，違約和止贖規模急遽擴大，全球危機成為「保森第一信用機會」的良機，其價值從1月到10月暴增550%，圈內人形容為金融市場史首見的漲幅。
保森是紐約大學商學院畢業，哈佛商學院MBA，2001年離開學術界轉入金融市場。他透露他2005年就擔心美國經濟活力會出問題。2006年美國房市榮景假象仍在，承做次貸的金融服務業者也維持優等債信評級，保森timing精準，致函投資人表示看壞房市和次貸證券，還遭受不少懷疑的眼光，但他獨排眾議，逆勢操作。他表示，專家們陷在次貸榮景的迷霧裡，見解不客觀。
不過，看空市場，還要有策略來獲利，他的策略就是CDS。Timing也是關鍵，他表示，如果2005年或之前就太早動手，他也會慘賠。
保森成為巴菲特以後華爾街人挑戰傳統智慧，自己走出一條大路的又一傳奇，連國際金融炒手索羅斯也邀他餐敘，向他討教押寶秘訣。
【2008/01/16 聯合晚報】@ http://udn.com/
收錄了爆掉的 case, 也要收錄在distribution 右邊的幸運兒們的個案。John Paulson 的 Paulson & Co. 恐怕是2007 全世界金融市場心情&薪情最好的人了, 在投資銀行界高盛能躲過次貸風暴賺錢 11b, 執行長因而可以分紅 7000萬美金以上, 已經是相當可觀的金額; 但比之於 J.P. 這小子可就遜色了。Paulson 的避險基金獲利 12b 約大於高盛, 但年終是 4b USD, 可是布蘭克芬的 5.3x。充分顯示出替人工作與自己當老闆的差別, 還有避險基金績效獎金分紅的威力 ^^
**************************************
投資大師保森 連葛老都加入他公司
【聯合晚報╱編譯彭淮棟/綜合報導】 2008.01.16 03:15 pm
美國次級房貸危機令各地投資者損失慘重，但53歲的避險基金高手保森卻能夠在2006年洞燭機先，看淡美國房市，看壞次級房貸，集資十億美元成立基金押注次貸資產和證券大跌，結果在2007年爆發的次貸風雲和信用危機中大發利市，「保森公司」進帳120億美元，他個人入袋40億美元 (台幣1228億元)，創下華爾街投資人最高年入紀錄，就連前聯準會主席葛林斯班也加入他的公司，因此他堪稱是金融市場中的「新索羅斯」。
保森公司從一個中等評級業者變成今天全球最大的避險基金管理公司之一，而且乘勝追擊，15日宣布，葛林斯班加盟他的避險基金管理公司，葛老要以他的老練經歷，為公司的套利絕招加持，成為15日華爾街要聞。葛老加盟為顧問委員會一員，職責是就可能影響金融市場的問題，為保森的投資管理團隊提供建言。
保森聲明說：「預期經濟方向並評估美國經濟衰退的可能性和嚴重性，對建構投資策略有根本重要性。葛林斯班博士擔任美國聯邦準備理事會主席18年，經歷多次市場循環，使他有獨特眼光來協助我們的投資管理團隊做關鍵性的決定。」
保森公司2006年成立「保森第一信用機會」基金，大買「信用違約交換」 (CDS)。CDS是一種衍生性金融商品，債權人透過CDS，把債務風險賣給他人，有如為債務買保險，CDS契約價格就是「保費」，一旦債務償還出現問題，保費即快速上漲。美國次貸風暴和國際信用危機在2007年滾雪球，違約和止贖規模急遽擴大，全球危機成為「保森第一信用機會」的良機，其價值從1月到10月暴增550%，圈內人形容為金融市場史首見的漲幅。
保森是紐約大學商學院畢業，哈佛商學院MBA，2001年離開學術界轉入金融市場。他透露他2005年就擔心美國經濟活力會出問題。2006年美國房市榮景假象仍在，承做次貸的金融服務業者也維持優等債信評級，保森timing精準，致函投資人表示看壞房市和次貸證券，還遭受不少懷疑的眼光，但他獨排眾議，逆勢操作。他表示，專家們陷在次貸榮景的迷霧裡，見解不客觀。
不過，看空市場，還要有策略來獲利，他的策略就是CDS。Timing也是關鍵，他表示，如果2005年或之前就太早動手，他也會慘賠。
保森成為巴菲特以後華爾街人挑戰傳統智慧，自己走出一條大路的又一傳奇，連國際金融炒手索羅斯也邀他餐敘，向他討教押寶秘訣。
【2008/01/16 聯合晚報】@ http://udn.com/
次級房貸重創 華爾街分紅仍可觀 高盛執行長拿22.7億
2007/12/18 00:06
記者賴廷奇／編譯
美國今年遭到次級房貸風暴重創，眼看12月就要過完了，華爾街的員工年終分紅是否會大幅縮水呢？其實不然，專家預測，雖然今年的分紅會比去年少，但是不會少太多，有些公司甚至很有可能發出華爾街史上最高的年終獎金。
美國經濟過去一年來飽受次級房貸肆虐，去年五家最賺錢的華爾街公司送出大約新台幣1.16兆元獎金的情景，今年應該不會出現。
風暴效應研究機構卡普指出，「美國的年終分紅可能會降低15%，世界各地的獎金可能會降低5%到10%。」
但是專家表示，華爾街今年的紅利還是相當可觀，尤其是避險得宜的公司。
舉例而言，高盛證券幾乎完全躲過了次級房貸風暴，今年獲利上看110億美元，大約是新台幣3561億元，外界估計，高盛的執行長布蘭克芬因該會分到7000萬美元的獎金，大需是新台幣22.7億元，一旦確定，這將會是華爾街有史以來，最高的個人獎金，但是專家預測，今年的紅利類型可能會有所改變。
風暴效應研究機構卡普表示，「通常高階主管的紅利會是50%現金、50%股票，但是今年有些公司可能會把股票的比例增加到70%。」
專家表示，不管經濟好不好，任何企業最需要的就是能夠帶領公司避開風險的人才，在次級房貸肆虐的今天，公司更是會砸下重金，就怕獨具慧眼的專業人士跳槽。
2007/12/18 00:06
記者賴廷奇／編譯
美國今年遭到次級房貸風暴重創，眼看12月就要過完了，華爾街的員工年終分紅是否會大幅縮水呢？其實不然，專家預測，雖然今年的分紅會比去年少，但是不會少太多，有些公司甚至很有可能發出華爾街史上最高的年終獎金。
美國經濟過去一年來飽受次級房貸肆虐，去年五家最賺錢的華爾街公司送出大約新台幣1.16兆元獎金的情景，今年應該不會出現。
風暴效應研究機構卡普指出，「美國的年終分紅可能會降低15%，世界各地的獎金可能會降低5%到10%。」
但是專家表示，華爾街今年的紅利還是相當可觀，尤其是避險得宜的公司。
舉例而言，高盛證券幾乎完全躲過了次級房貸風暴，今年獲利上看110億美元，大約是新台幣3561億元，外界估計，高盛的執行長布蘭克芬因該會分到7000萬美元的獎金，大需是新台幣22.7億元，一旦確定，這將會是華爾街有史以來，最高的個人獎金，但是專家預測，今年的紅利類型可能會有所改變。
風暴效應研究機構卡普表示，「通常高階主管的紅利會是50%現金、50%股票，但是今年有些公司可能會把股票的比例增加到70%。」
專家表示，不管經濟好不好，任何企業最需要的就是能夠帶領公司避開風險的人才，在次級房貸肆虐的今天，公司更是會砸下重金，就怕獨具慧眼的專業人士跳槽。
反向操作次貸市場 這檔避險基金報酬率狂飆上1000%！
鉅亨網黃欣／綜合外電．11月27日
一檔成立於美國加州的避險基金，受惠於今年美國次級房屋抵押貸款風暴，已經達到了 1000%的報酬率，使其躋身全球獲利最佳的避險基金之列。
Lahde Capital 在去年由Andrew Lahde所成立，由於近來信貸市場仍餘波盪漾，其旗下的一檔避險基金，上週己衝破扣除手續費後獲利仍達 1000%的高點。
倫敦《金融時報》報導，次貸相關證券價值的下滑，反而使一群早就看出次貸問題所在的基金得到可觀的獲利。這些避險基金從去年起，就利用衍生商品投資低品質美國家庭貸款的空頭部位，而這個投資策略，讓他們在今年內已賺了超過 200億美元，成了有史以來獲利最高的單一投資。
在這些避險基金中，規模最大、管理 280億美元的資金的Paulson & Co，已藉此賺進120億美元。Lahde Capital則是同類型避險基金中規模最小的。
雖然它的收益如此高，但 Lahde卻已經開始把資金還給投資人，並告訴投資人，「風險報酬數字所表現出的吸引力已經大不如前。」
在 Lahde寫給投資人的信中，他預測美國經濟會進入蕭條期。他並認為在蕭條期中，由商用不動產擔保的債券，將會重演次貸相關證券的戲碼。
「我們的金融體系根本就是個災難。我認為，如果所有大銀行都把他們的資產放到市場上，那麼他們都將破產。」 Lahde寫道。他也提及，他將把個人的部份獲利轉投資到黃金和其他貴金屬市場。
Lahde 利用這個現象來延伸他事業的觸角，在今年秋天成立了另一檔做空商用不動產的基金－而這檔基金在近 2個月內，已經達到了 42%的報酬率。此外，他還有意再成立一檔基金，反向投資更廣泛的信用委託市場。
而 Lahde的第一檔避險基金，US Residential Real Estate Hedge V Class A ，在10月底已經達到712.8%的報酬率，而在11月中上旬的賣壓推升下，報酬率一舉突破了1000%。
沒有確切的數據說明，到底有多少基金能夠在一年內達到10倍的報酬率，但英國 RAB Capital旗下的避險基金 Special Situations fund，曾在2003年達到 1475.5%報酬率的卓越成績。該檔基金目前管理24億美元資金，並且是受次貸問題影響的英國 Northern Rock銀行最大股東。
其他反向操作次貸市場的避險基金，如Paulson &Co旗下的Credit Opportunities，在10月底報酬率達550.8%；另檔成立於美國德州的Subprime CreditStrategies fund，則有526.5%的報酬率
鉅亨網黃欣／綜合外電．11月27日
一檔成立於美國加州的避險基金，受惠於今年美國次級房屋抵押貸款風暴，已經達到了 1000%的報酬率，使其躋身全球獲利最佳的避險基金之列。
Lahde Capital 在去年由Andrew Lahde所成立，由於近來信貸市場仍餘波盪漾，其旗下的一檔避險基金，上週己衝破扣除手續費後獲利仍達 1000%的高點。
倫敦《金融時報》報導，次貸相關證券價值的下滑，反而使一群早就看出次貸問題所在的基金得到可觀的獲利。這些避險基金從去年起，就利用衍生商品投資低品質美國家庭貸款的空頭部位，而這個投資策略，讓他們在今年內已賺了超過 200億美元，成了有史以來獲利最高的單一投資。
在這些避險基金中，規模最大、管理 280億美元的資金的Paulson & Co，已藉此賺進120億美元。Lahde Capital則是同類型避險基金中規模最小的。
雖然它的收益如此高，但 Lahde卻已經開始把資金還給投資人，並告訴投資人，「風險報酬數字所表現出的吸引力已經大不如前。」
在 Lahde寫給投資人的信中，他預測美國經濟會進入蕭條期。他並認為在蕭條期中，由商用不動產擔保的債券，將會重演次貸相關證券的戲碼。
「我們的金融體系根本就是個災難。我認為，如果所有大銀行都把他們的資產放到市場上，那麼他們都將破產。」 Lahde寫道。他也提及，他將把個人的部份獲利轉投資到黃金和其他貴金屬市場。
Lahde 利用這個現象來延伸他事業的觸角，在今年秋天成立了另一檔做空商用不動產的基金－而這檔基金在近 2個月內，已經達到了 42%的報酬率。此外，他還有意再成立一檔基金，反向投資更廣泛的信用委託市場。
而 Lahde的第一檔避險基金，US Residential Real Estate Hedge V Class A ，在10月底已經達到712.8%的報酬率，而在11月中上旬的賣壓推升下，報酬率一舉突破了1000%。
沒有確切的數據說明，到底有多少基金能夠在一年內達到10倍的報酬率，但英國 RAB Capital旗下的避險基金 Special Situations fund，曾在2003年達到 1475.5%報酬率的卓越成績。該檔基金目前管理24億美元資金，並且是受次貸問題影響的英國 Northern Rock銀行最大股東。
其他反向操作次貸市場的避險基金，如Paulson &Co旗下的Credit Opportunities，在10月底報酬率達550.8%；另檔成立於美國德州的Subprime CreditStrategies fund，則有526.5%的報酬率
A trader who made $3-4B on subprime in just 1 yr
http://online.wsj.com
On Wall Street, the losers in the collapse of the housing market are legion. The biggest winner looks to be John Paulson, a little-known hedge fund manager who smelled trouble two years ago.
Funds he runs were up $15 billion in 2007 on a spectacularly successful bet against the housing market. Mr. Paulson has reaped an estimated $3 billion to $4 billion for himself -- believed to be the largest one-year payday in Wall Street history.
Now, in another twist in financial history, Mr. Paulson is retaining as an adviser a man some blame for helping feed the housing-market bubble by keeping interest rates so low: former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. (See article.)
On the way to his big score, Mr. Paulson did battle with a Wall Street firm he accused of trying to manipulate the market. He faced skepticism from other big investors. At the same time, fearing imitators, he used software that blocked fund investors from forwarding his emails.
One thing he didn’t count on: A friend in whom he had confided tried the strategy on his own -- racking up huge gains himself, and straining their friendship. (See article.)
Like many legendary market killings, from Warren Buffett’s takeovers of small companies in the ’70s to Wilbur Ross’s steelmaker consolidation earlier this decade, Mr. Paulson’s sprang from defying conventional wisdom. In early 2006, the wisdom was that while loose lending standards might be of some concern, deep trouble in the housing and mortgage markets was unlikely. A lot of big Wall Street players were in this camp, as seen by the giant mortgage-market losses they’re disclosing.
"Most people told us house prices never go down on a national level, and that there had never been a default of an investment-grade-rated mortgage bond," Mr. Paulson says. "Mortgage experts were too caught up" in the housing boom.
In several interviews, Mr. Paulson made his first comments on how he made his historic coup. Merely holding a different opinion from the blundering herd wasn’t enough to produce huge profits. He also had to think up a technical way to bet against the housing and mortgage markets, given that, as he notes, "you can’t short houses."
Also key: Mr. Paulson didn’t turn bearish too early. Some close students of the housing market did just that, investing for a downturn years ago -- only to suffer such painful losses waiting for a collapse that they finally unwound their bearish bets. Mr. Paulson, whose investment specialty lay elsewhere, turned his attention to the housing market more recently, and got bearish at just about the right time.
Word of his success got around in the world of hedge funds -- investment partnerships for institutions and rich individuals. George Soros invited Mr. Paulson to lunch, asking for details of how he laid his bets, with instruments that didn’t exist a few years ago. Mr. Soros is famous for another big score, a 1992 bet against the British pound that earned $1 billion for his Quantum hedge fund. He declined to comment.
Mr. Paulson, who grew up in New York’s Queens borough, began his career working for another legendary investor, Leon Levy of Odyssey Partners. Now 51 years old, Mr. Paulson benefited from an earlier housing slump 15 years ago, buying a New York apartment and a large home in the Hamptons on Long Island, both in foreclosure sales.
After Odyssey, Mr. Paulson -- no relation to the Treasury secretary -- became a mergers-and-acquisitions investment banker at Bear Stearns Cos. Next he was a mergers arbitrager at Gruss & Co., often betting on bonds to fall in value.
In 1994 he started his own hedge fund, focusing on M&A. Starting with $2 million, he built it to $500 million by 2002 through a combination of its returns and new money from investors. After the post-tech-bubble economic slump, he bought up debt of struggling companies, and profited as the economy recovered. His funds, run out of Manhattan offices decorated with Alexander Calder sculptures, did well but not spectacularly.
Auto Suppliers
By 2005, Mr. Paulson, known as J.P., worried that U.S. economic strength would flag. He began selling short the bonds of companies such as auto suppliers, that is, betting on them to fall in value. Instead, they kept rising, even bonds of companies in bankruptcy proceedings.
[John Paulson]
"This is crazy," Mr. Paulson recalls telling an analyst at his firm. He urged his traders to find a way to protect his investments and profit if problems developed in the overall economy. The question he posed to them: "Where is the bubble we can short?"
They found it in housing. Upbeat mortgage specialists kept repeating that home prices never fall on a national basis or that the Fed could save the market by slashing interest rates.
One Wall Street specialty during the boom was repackaging mortgage securities into instruments called collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, then selling slices of these with varying levels of risk.
For buyers of the slices who wanted to insure against the debt going bad, Wall Street offered another instrument, called credit-default swaps.
Naturally, the riskier the debt that such a swap "insured," the more the swap would cost. And this price would go up if default risk appeared to be increasing. This meant an investor of a bearish bent could buy the swaps as a way to bet on bad news happening.
During the boom, however, many were so blind to housing risk that this "default insurance" was priced very cheaply. Analyzing reams of data late at night in his office, Mr. Paulson became convinced investors were far underestimating the risk in the mortgage market. In betting on it to crumble, "I’ve never been involved in a trade that had such unlimited upside with a very limited downside," he says.
Paulo Pelligrini, a portfolio manager at Paulson & Co., began to implement complex debt trades that would pay off if mortgages lost value. One trade was to short risky CDO slices.
Another was to buy the credit-default swaps that complacent investors seemed to be pricing too low.
"We’ve got to take as much advantage of this as we can," Mr. Paulson recalls telling a colleague around the middle of 2005, when optimism about the housing market was at its peak.
His bets at first were losers. But lenders were getting less and less rigorous about making sure borrowers could pay their mortgages. Mr. Paulson’s research told him home prices were flattening. Suspecting that rating agencies were too generous in assessing complex securities built out of mortgages, he had his team begin tracking tens of thousands of mortgages. They concluded it was getting harder for lenders to collect.
His confidence rose in January 2006. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., then the largest maker of "subprime" loans to buyers with spotty credit, settled a probe of improper lending practices by agreeing to a $325 million payment. The deal convinced Mr. Paulson that aggressive lending was widespread.
He decided to launch a hedge fund solely to bet against risky mortgages. Skeptical investors told him that others with more experience in the field remained upbeat and that he was straying from his area of expertise. Mr. Paulson raised about $150 million for the new fund, largely from European investors. It opened in mid-2006 with Mr. Pelligrini as co-manager.
http://online.wsj.com
On Wall Street, the losers in the collapse of the housing market are legion. The biggest winner looks to be John Paulson, a little-known hedge fund manager who smelled trouble two years ago.
Funds he runs were up $15 billion in 2007 on a spectacularly successful bet against the housing market. Mr. Paulson has reaped an estimated $3 billion to $4 billion for himself -- believed to be the largest one-year payday in Wall Street history.
Now, in another twist in financial history, Mr. Paulson is retaining as an adviser a man some blame for helping feed the housing-market bubble by keeping interest rates so low: former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. (See article.)
On the way to his big score, Mr. Paulson did battle with a Wall Street firm he accused of trying to manipulate the market. He faced skepticism from other big investors. At the same time, fearing imitators, he used software that blocked fund investors from forwarding his emails.
One thing he didn’t count on: A friend in whom he had confided tried the strategy on his own -- racking up huge gains himself, and straining their friendship. (See article.)
Like many legendary market killings, from Warren Buffett’s takeovers of small companies in the ’70s to Wilbur Ross’s steelmaker consolidation earlier this decade, Mr. Paulson’s sprang from defying conventional wisdom. In early 2006, the wisdom was that while loose lending standards might be of some concern, deep trouble in the housing and mortgage markets was unlikely. A lot of big Wall Street players were in this camp, as seen by the giant mortgage-market losses they’re disclosing.
"Most people told us house prices never go down on a national level, and that there had never been a default of an investment-grade-rated mortgage bond," Mr. Paulson says. "Mortgage experts were too caught up" in the housing boom.
In several interviews, Mr. Paulson made his first comments on how he made his historic coup. Merely holding a different opinion from the blundering herd wasn’t enough to produce huge profits. He also had to think up a technical way to bet against the housing and mortgage markets, given that, as he notes, "you can’t short houses."
Also key: Mr. Paulson didn’t turn bearish too early. Some close students of the housing market did just that, investing for a downturn years ago -- only to suffer such painful losses waiting for a collapse that they finally unwound their bearish bets. Mr. Paulson, whose investment specialty lay elsewhere, turned his attention to the housing market more recently, and got bearish at just about the right time.
Word of his success got around in the world of hedge funds -- investment partnerships for institutions and rich individuals. George Soros invited Mr. Paulson to lunch, asking for details of how he laid his bets, with instruments that didn’t exist a few years ago. Mr. Soros is famous for another big score, a 1992 bet against the British pound that earned $1 billion for his Quantum hedge fund. He declined to comment.
Mr. Paulson, who grew up in New York’s Queens borough, began his career working for another legendary investor, Leon Levy of Odyssey Partners. Now 51 years old, Mr. Paulson benefited from an earlier housing slump 15 years ago, buying a New York apartment and a large home in the Hamptons on Long Island, both in foreclosure sales.
After Odyssey, Mr. Paulson -- no relation to the Treasury secretary -- became a mergers-and-acquisitions investment banker at Bear Stearns Cos. Next he was a mergers arbitrager at Gruss & Co., often betting on bonds to fall in value.
In 1994 he started his own hedge fund, focusing on M&A. Starting with $2 million, he built it to $500 million by 2002 through a combination of its returns and new money from investors. After the post-tech-bubble economic slump, he bought up debt of struggling companies, and profited as the economy recovered. His funds, run out of Manhattan offices decorated with Alexander Calder sculptures, did well but not spectacularly.
Auto Suppliers
By 2005, Mr. Paulson, known as J.P., worried that U.S. economic strength would flag. He began selling short the bonds of companies such as auto suppliers, that is, betting on them to fall in value. Instead, they kept rising, even bonds of companies in bankruptcy proceedings.
[John Paulson]
"This is crazy," Mr. Paulson recalls telling an analyst at his firm. He urged his traders to find a way to protect his investments and profit if problems developed in the overall economy. The question he posed to them: "Where is the bubble we can short?"
They found it in housing. Upbeat mortgage specialists kept repeating that home prices never fall on a national basis or that the Fed could save the market by slashing interest rates.
One Wall Street specialty during the boom was repackaging mortgage securities into instruments called collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, then selling slices of these with varying levels of risk.
For buyers of the slices who wanted to insure against the debt going bad, Wall Street offered another instrument, called credit-default swaps.
Naturally, the riskier the debt that such a swap "insured," the more the swap would cost. And this price would go up if default risk appeared to be increasing. This meant an investor of a bearish bent could buy the swaps as a way to bet on bad news happening.
During the boom, however, many were so blind to housing risk that this "default insurance" was priced very cheaply. Analyzing reams of data late at night in his office, Mr. Paulson became convinced investors were far underestimating the risk in the mortgage market. In betting on it to crumble, "I’ve never been involved in a trade that had such unlimited upside with a very limited downside," he says.
Paulo Pelligrini, a portfolio manager at Paulson & Co., began to implement complex debt trades that would pay off if mortgages lost value. One trade was to short risky CDO slices.
Another was to buy the credit-default swaps that complacent investors seemed to be pricing too low.
"We’ve got to take as much advantage of this as we can," Mr. Paulson recalls telling a colleague around the middle of 2005, when optimism about the housing market was at its peak.
His bets at first were losers. But lenders were getting less and less rigorous about making sure borrowers could pay their mortgages. Mr. Paulson’s research told him home prices were flattening. Suspecting that rating agencies were too generous in assessing complex securities built out of mortgages, he had his team begin tracking tens of thousands of mortgages. They concluded it was getting harder for lenders to collect.
His confidence rose in January 2006. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., then the largest maker of "subprime" loans to buyers with spotty credit, settled a probe of improper lending practices by agreeing to a $325 million payment. The deal convinced Mr. Paulson that aggressive lending was widespread.
He decided to launch a hedge fund solely to bet against risky mortgages. Skeptical investors told him that others with more experience in the field remained upbeat and that he was straying from his area of expertise. Mr. Paulson raised about $150 million for the new fund, largely from European investors. It opened in mid-2006 with Mr. Pelligrini as co-manager.
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其實業界的這些交易員能賺取高額利潤, 在於本身有良好的交易策略, 並懂得利用一些交易工具在互相交叉運用後賺取市場上的利潤, 這也是她們的核心價值所在, 否則人人都會賭一把, 為何公司願意將如此龐大的部位交給少數的兩三人操作, 但如果沒有這些工具, 則會有"巧婦難為無米之炊"的困境, 即使有再好的交易策略也發揮不出來. 交易員能獲取高額的分配比例, 不單只是錢的問題, 也牽扯到交易員覺得對公司來說你值多少, 是自尊的問題. 而要交易員在原來公司領賞職前離開而加入新公司, 市場慣例多少也會有一些保證獎金或補償, ㄧ方面是為了使交易員能放心的加入, 補貼你因提早離開而造成的損失, 另ㄧ方面也可以看出對公司來說你的提早加入值多少, 是互相的問題. 交易員本身也是靠天吃飯, 每年是否能獲利也都在未知數, 保森也在辛苦多年後, 因為ㄧ次賭對方向而聲名大噪, 他也懂得利用這一次成功而擴大自己的基金規模, 因為沒有人能保證下一年依然能成功, 交易員心知肚明市場對交易員是現實的. 他們一兩次的高額獎金分紅, 隨時都有可能是最後一次領賞, 因為下一秒就有可能因一次的失誤而被市場永遠放逐, 爬的越高摔的越重. 這就是”天下沒有白吃的午餐”. 否則他寧可以選擇作一個dealer, 一定不會出大錯而安穩的過一生. 所以這些避險交易員領賞的背後也正代表著他們生命的不確定性……..