2000-08-09 02:14:31包淳亮
中國人民武裝警察(下)
A NEW STATUS FOR THE PAP
Given its PLA origin, the PAP's organization is modeled after the army. PAP soldiers enroll for compulsory service as do the soldiers of the PLA. Altogether, the connection between the PLA and the PAP has not always been clear, but recent legislation concerning the army has shed some new light. There is no direct relation between the two groups, but PLA regulations often apply to the PAP which falls under the command of the CMC.
A military organization
Military regulations issued by the CMC in recent years specify the nature of the PAP in relation with the PLA. For example, Article 324 of the Routine Service Regulations of the PLA (中國人民解放軍內務條令) states that "PAP troops should follow these regulations for their routine duties." Similar articles can be found in other legal documents such as The PLA Discipline Regulations (中國人民解放軍紀律條令), The PLA Formation Regulations (中國人民解放軍隊列條令), The PLA Garrison Regulations (中國人民解放軍警備條令), as well in the National Defense Law (國防法) approved in March 1997.
Besides following PLA regulations, the PAP is sometimes asked to cooperate with the PLA in military operations. In "high-tech regional warfare," the PAP is required to cooperate with the PLA. In military exercises, cooperation may also exist. In 1995, for example, the PAP and the civil militia jointly participated with the PLA in a military exercise near Jinmen (金門, Quemoy), being in charge of the security in the area where the exercise was held.18
Scandals and reshuffling
Following June 4, 1989, the PAP saw its status rising. However, on February 2, 1996, the murder of Li Peiyao (李沛瑤), a vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, by a PAP soldier led to a wide reshuffling in the PAP leadership. Ba Zhongtan (巴忠倓), the PAP Commander, resigned "because of his age" (he was born in 1930). So did Zhang Shutian (張樹田), the Political Commissar, as well as other leading PAP officers. Ba Zhongtan was widely rumored to have been involved in several scandals at that time. His close connection with Jiang Zemin probably helped him, and he was nevertheless elected as an army representative in the Ninth NPC (in 1993 he was elected as a Shandong representative to the Eighth NPC).19
With a new leadership, the PAP's political status continued to rise. At the Fifteenth Party Congress (in September 1997), the PAP had 37 representatives which had been elected by an independent electoral college, while in the past they were amalgamated with the PLA. The PAP Commander, Yang Guoping and the PAP Political Commissar, Xu Yongqing (徐永清) were made members of the Central Committee (CC), a position which had not been given to their predecessors. Besides, a PAP Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Zhu Chengyou (朱成友), a Deputy Commander of the Chendu Military Region until December 1996, became an alternate CC member, thus placing him at a higher political level than most deputy commanders of the military regions.20
In another development, on August 1, 1996, a PAP Military Court and a PAP Military Procuratorate were set up and ranked as organizations of "large military unit level" (大單位級). In other words, the PAP can be considered to be now at the same level as the military regions. This was also underscored, on March 27 this year, when Commander Yang Guoping became the first three-star general in the PAP's history.21
OF NUMBERS AND QUALITY
From the time of its creation in 1983 to the present, the PAP has continuously developed and set up new units. Its total number expanded, but the lack of official data in the press makes it difficult to assess its exact size at present.
How many are they?
According to the authoritative Jane Defense Weekly, at the time of its creation, the PAP was a force of around 500,000 soldiers and officers. By 1989, it had grown to around 610,000 troops and various reports indicate that another 200,000 troops were added between 1989 and 1995. Therefore, at present the whole force should number around 800,000 men. However, computations vary and some researchers reckon that the PAP was close to one million in 1995, others put forward the figure of 1.12 million for the spring of 1995, and still others estimate the total at 1.2 million.22
The deployment of the new mobile units and the demobilization of 500,000 PLA soldiers announced by Jiang Zemin at the Fifteenth Party Congress have led military analysts to suspect that the PAP could grow by one or two hundred thousand. As a result, the force could well exceed one million and some reports even predict that the total figure could reach 1.3 million or 1.8 million.23 The highest figure is given in the Hong Kong monthly Dongxiang (動向) which says that the PAP had 2.2 million troops in 1996, and should be over three million in 2000.24 However, if one follows yet another report which states that in large municipalities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Urumqi, the PAP members are less numerous than the local Public Security Police,25 one could assume that the PAP does not exceed one million.
Recruitment and transfers
Recruitment and promotions are different in the PAP and in the PLA. Under normal circumstances, a PLA soldier who has finished his term of service will not be transferred to the PAP. Even though the swelling of the PAP ranks was due to the restructuring of the PLA, the new recruits were not demobilized soldiers. In the past five years, 240,000 military cadres were demobilized and transferred to other occupations.26 The demobilization announced by Jiang Zemin concerns twice that number and must be carried out within three years. It is not yet clear how and where these soldiers will be relocated. However, it has been confirmed that a number of the soldiers to be demobilized will join the ranks of the PAP.27 This means that the PAP could increase from 100,000 to 200,000 soldiers and that the border defense units, especially in Northwestern and Southwestern China, could be important beneficiaries of the PLA reform. Mergers could possibly take place, such as in the Xinjiang military district, where two PLA and PAP border defense units currently coexist side by side.28
While the PAP is taking in new recruits, another phenomenon is happening, namely the transfer of PAP soldiers and officers to the ranks of the Public Security Police. It was announced at the end of last year that the State Council had approved a reform of the border inspection teams. According to the new plan, inspectors must become professionals and can no longer be soldiers doing their compulsory military service. In other words, they would no longer be PAP soldiers. These inspectors would be placed directly under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security through an "Entry and Exit Border Defense Inspection General Unit" (入境邊防檢查總站) which has to be set up before June 30, 1998. As the report concluded, it will simplify matters for the Ministry of Public Security which will then have direct responsibility over all border defense police. The new scheme started this January in Shenzhen where the border defense unit of the PAP was professionalized and became border police. The same is also happening in Beijing and Shanghai and other border points.29
Budget and subsidies
Although some of the PAP activities are being transferred to the Public Security Police, the expansion of the PAP seems to go faster than that of the Public Security Police. One of the major reasons is budgetary. During the Third Session of the Eighth NPC (in March 1995), a top Beijing PAP officer complained that "we can no longer fight crime just walking on our two feet and riding bicycles like in the past."30 The officer's request was understandable, but with a limited government budget, increasing the ranks of the PAP with soldiers doing their compulsory military service is cheaper than recruiting professional policemen.
The allowance of a PLA soldier, depending on his rank, ranges from 60 to 80 yuan. This is also the case for a PAP soldier. In addition to this allowance, the government subsidizes part of the mess fee to the amount of 6 yuan per day per soldier. Because the PAP cannot receive a budget allocation from the central government sufficient to support itself, provincial governments also provide subsidies not only in money but also in kind____providing land and farms where PAP soldiers can raise crops for themselves.31
Production varies according to farms and regions. For example, in 1995 the PAP produced 20,330 tons of grain, 41,660 tons of vegetables, and 8,440 tons of meat, which earned the force a total income of 150 million yuan. In 1997, 65 per cent of the PAP units were self-sufficient for meat and vegetables, compared to 59 per cent in 1996. It is hoped that this year about 80 per cent of the squadrons (中隊) could produce 70 per cent of the vegetables and meat they need. However, there are often conflicts of interest since the PAP must rely on local resources to promote its own living standards. In 1992, the PAP General Headquarters sent 137 teams to audit 512 units [branch unit (支隊), and above] and found many cases of corruption.32
Management and education
The quality of the PAP force is an issue which has been high on the leaders' agenda following the 1996 reshuffle. When they were appointed, Commander Yang Guoping and Political Commissar Xu Yongqing strongly urged high- and middle-ranking cadres to place ideology and political construction as a priority in their efforts to improve the educational level and the management of the troops. As reported, the troops also want to improve their quality by attaining higher levels of education. In the Guangdong General Unit, more than 90 per cent of the cadres have at least a senior high school diploma, and over 30 per cent of them a college degree. Though these achievements may be modest, the unit is proud of them and considers itself a PAP general unit which highly regards "the cultural level of its cadres."33 Such an admission may lead one to think that it is not the case everywhere.
If cadres can be said to be better educated, this is not the case for the majority of PAP soldiers. Most of them join the force between 16 and 18 years of age, and there have even been some cases of soldiers being under 14. At the time of conscription, they were junior high school students, who often came from the countryside and joined the PAP with the hope of gaining social status, including Party membership. A new feature of the new recruits is the increasing number coming from one-child families. As the Political Commissar of the Hunan General Unit complained, much has to be done "to develop their sense of responsibility and honor, their ability to endure hardships and their spirit of selflessness."
The low quality of the PAP troops was a common complaint by PAP officers during the 1996 NPC session, at the time of the reshuffling. A report of the Hong Kong Dagong Daily relayed the complaints of some PAP generals. All stressed how the "many temptations of society" made it difficult for them to lead their troops properly. Low wages, the "complex nature" of the PAP and the inadequacies of the traditional political education were decried. The situation may have improved in the last two years but managerial and personnel problems continue to exist which make it difficult for the PAP to become a regular police force of high standards.34
‧
In the 1980s, the PLA's military goal was to win a "high-tech regional war." Thus the PAP's role in the control of internal security became all the more important. With better transportation networks and better equipment, the PAP is now able to answer more calls rapidly and with a smaller number of men. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the PAP's total force could continue to grow as some have predicted.
Recent political, economic and social evolutions have certainly benefited the PAP in its development. The Chinese government needs a force ready to deal with any kind of domestic turbulence at any moment. In that regard, the PAP is still called to play an important role. It can also help the Chinese police to become more efficient and better organized. A likely evolution could be that a greater emphasis will be placed on the "Police" role of this military body. This may be what is most needed at present.
Given its PLA origin, the PAP's organization is modeled after the army. PAP soldiers enroll for compulsory service as do the soldiers of the PLA. Altogether, the connection between the PLA and the PAP has not always been clear, but recent legislation concerning the army has shed some new light. There is no direct relation between the two groups, but PLA regulations often apply to the PAP which falls under the command of the CMC.
A military organization
Military regulations issued by the CMC in recent years specify the nature of the PAP in relation with the PLA. For example, Article 324 of the Routine Service Regulations of the PLA (中國人民解放軍內務條令) states that "PAP troops should follow these regulations for their routine duties." Similar articles can be found in other legal documents such as The PLA Discipline Regulations (中國人民解放軍紀律條令), The PLA Formation Regulations (中國人民解放軍隊列條令), The PLA Garrison Regulations (中國人民解放軍警備條令), as well in the National Defense Law (國防法) approved in March 1997.
Besides following PLA regulations, the PAP is sometimes asked to cooperate with the PLA in military operations. In "high-tech regional warfare," the PAP is required to cooperate with the PLA. In military exercises, cooperation may also exist. In 1995, for example, the PAP and the civil militia jointly participated with the PLA in a military exercise near Jinmen (金門, Quemoy), being in charge of the security in the area where the exercise was held.18
Scandals and reshuffling
Following June 4, 1989, the PAP saw its status rising. However, on February 2, 1996, the murder of Li Peiyao (李沛瑤), a vice-chairman of the National People's Congress, by a PAP soldier led to a wide reshuffling in the PAP leadership. Ba Zhongtan (巴忠倓), the PAP Commander, resigned "because of his age" (he was born in 1930). So did Zhang Shutian (張樹田), the Political Commissar, as well as other leading PAP officers. Ba Zhongtan was widely rumored to have been involved in several scandals at that time. His close connection with Jiang Zemin probably helped him, and he was nevertheless elected as an army representative in the Ninth NPC (in 1993 he was elected as a Shandong representative to the Eighth NPC).19
With a new leadership, the PAP's political status continued to rise. At the Fifteenth Party Congress (in September 1997), the PAP had 37 representatives which had been elected by an independent electoral college, while in the past they were amalgamated with the PLA. The PAP Commander, Yang Guoping and the PAP Political Commissar, Xu Yongqing (徐永清) were made members of the Central Committee (CC), a position which had not been given to their predecessors. Besides, a PAP Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General Zhu Chengyou (朱成友), a Deputy Commander of the Chendu Military Region until December 1996, became an alternate CC member, thus placing him at a higher political level than most deputy commanders of the military regions.20
In another development, on August 1, 1996, a PAP Military Court and a PAP Military Procuratorate were set up and ranked as organizations of "large military unit level" (大單位級). In other words, the PAP can be considered to be now at the same level as the military regions. This was also underscored, on March 27 this year, when Commander Yang Guoping became the first three-star general in the PAP's history.21
OF NUMBERS AND QUALITY
From the time of its creation in 1983 to the present, the PAP has continuously developed and set up new units. Its total number expanded, but the lack of official data in the press makes it difficult to assess its exact size at present.
How many are they?
According to the authoritative Jane Defense Weekly, at the time of its creation, the PAP was a force of around 500,000 soldiers and officers. By 1989, it had grown to around 610,000 troops and various reports indicate that another 200,000 troops were added between 1989 and 1995. Therefore, at present the whole force should number around 800,000 men. However, computations vary and some researchers reckon that the PAP was close to one million in 1995, others put forward the figure of 1.12 million for the spring of 1995, and still others estimate the total at 1.2 million.22
The deployment of the new mobile units and the demobilization of 500,000 PLA soldiers announced by Jiang Zemin at the Fifteenth Party Congress have led military analysts to suspect that the PAP could grow by one or two hundred thousand. As a result, the force could well exceed one million and some reports even predict that the total figure could reach 1.3 million or 1.8 million.23 The highest figure is given in the Hong Kong monthly Dongxiang (動向) which says that the PAP had 2.2 million troops in 1996, and should be over three million in 2000.24 However, if one follows yet another report which states that in large municipalities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Urumqi, the PAP members are less numerous than the local Public Security Police,25 one could assume that the PAP does not exceed one million.
Recruitment and transfers
Recruitment and promotions are different in the PAP and in the PLA. Under normal circumstances, a PLA soldier who has finished his term of service will not be transferred to the PAP. Even though the swelling of the PAP ranks was due to the restructuring of the PLA, the new recruits were not demobilized soldiers. In the past five years, 240,000 military cadres were demobilized and transferred to other occupations.26 The demobilization announced by Jiang Zemin concerns twice that number and must be carried out within three years. It is not yet clear how and where these soldiers will be relocated. However, it has been confirmed that a number of the soldiers to be demobilized will join the ranks of the PAP.27 This means that the PAP could increase from 100,000 to 200,000 soldiers and that the border defense units, especially in Northwestern and Southwestern China, could be important beneficiaries of the PLA reform. Mergers could possibly take place, such as in the Xinjiang military district, where two PLA and PAP border defense units currently coexist side by side.28
While the PAP is taking in new recruits, another phenomenon is happening, namely the transfer of PAP soldiers and officers to the ranks of the Public Security Police. It was announced at the end of last year that the State Council had approved a reform of the border inspection teams. According to the new plan, inspectors must become professionals and can no longer be soldiers doing their compulsory military service. In other words, they would no longer be PAP soldiers. These inspectors would be placed directly under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Security through an "Entry and Exit Border Defense Inspection General Unit" (入境邊防檢查總站) which has to be set up before June 30, 1998. As the report concluded, it will simplify matters for the Ministry of Public Security which will then have direct responsibility over all border defense police. The new scheme started this January in Shenzhen where the border defense unit of the PAP was professionalized and became border police. The same is also happening in Beijing and Shanghai and other border points.29
Budget and subsidies
Although some of the PAP activities are being transferred to the Public Security Police, the expansion of the PAP seems to go faster than that of the Public Security Police. One of the major reasons is budgetary. During the Third Session of the Eighth NPC (in March 1995), a top Beijing PAP officer complained that "we can no longer fight crime just walking on our two feet and riding bicycles like in the past."30 The officer's request was understandable, but with a limited government budget, increasing the ranks of the PAP with soldiers doing their compulsory military service is cheaper than recruiting professional policemen.
The allowance of a PLA soldier, depending on his rank, ranges from 60 to 80 yuan. This is also the case for a PAP soldier. In addition to this allowance, the government subsidizes part of the mess fee to the amount of 6 yuan per day per soldier. Because the PAP cannot receive a budget allocation from the central government sufficient to support itself, provincial governments also provide subsidies not only in money but also in kind____providing land and farms where PAP soldiers can raise crops for themselves.31
Production varies according to farms and regions. For example, in 1995 the PAP produced 20,330 tons of grain, 41,660 tons of vegetables, and 8,440 tons of meat, which earned the force a total income of 150 million yuan. In 1997, 65 per cent of the PAP units were self-sufficient for meat and vegetables, compared to 59 per cent in 1996. It is hoped that this year about 80 per cent of the squadrons (中隊) could produce 70 per cent of the vegetables and meat they need. However, there are often conflicts of interest since the PAP must rely on local resources to promote its own living standards. In 1992, the PAP General Headquarters sent 137 teams to audit 512 units [branch unit (支隊), and above] and found many cases of corruption.32
Management and education
The quality of the PAP force is an issue which has been high on the leaders' agenda following the 1996 reshuffle. When they were appointed, Commander Yang Guoping and Political Commissar Xu Yongqing strongly urged high- and middle-ranking cadres to place ideology and political construction as a priority in their efforts to improve the educational level and the management of the troops. As reported, the troops also want to improve their quality by attaining higher levels of education. In the Guangdong General Unit, more than 90 per cent of the cadres have at least a senior high school diploma, and over 30 per cent of them a college degree. Though these achievements may be modest, the unit is proud of them and considers itself a PAP general unit which highly regards "the cultural level of its cadres."33 Such an admission may lead one to think that it is not the case everywhere.
If cadres can be said to be better educated, this is not the case for the majority of PAP soldiers. Most of them join the force between 16 and 18 years of age, and there have even been some cases of soldiers being under 14. At the time of conscription, they were junior high school students, who often came from the countryside and joined the PAP with the hope of gaining social status, including Party membership. A new feature of the new recruits is the increasing number coming from one-child families. As the Political Commissar of the Hunan General Unit complained, much has to be done "to develop their sense of responsibility and honor, their ability to endure hardships and their spirit of selflessness."
The low quality of the PAP troops was a common complaint by PAP officers during the 1996 NPC session, at the time of the reshuffling. A report of the Hong Kong Dagong Daily relayed the complaints of some PAP generals. All stressed how the "many temptations of society" made it difficult for them to lead their troops properly. Low wages, the "complex nature" of the PAP and the inadequacies of the traditional political education were decried. The situation may have improved in the last two years but managerial and personnel problems continue to exist which make it difficult for the PAP to become a regular police force of high standards.34
‧
In the 1980s, the PLA's military goal was to win a "high-tech regional war." Thus the PAP's role in the control of internal security became all the more important. With better transportation networks and better equipment, the PAP is now able to answer more calls rapidly and with a smaller number of men. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the PAP's total force could continue to grow as some have predicted.
Recent political, economic and social evolutions have certainly benefited the PAP in its development. The Chinese government needs a force ready to deal with any kind of domestic turbulence at any moment. In that regard, the PAP is still called to play an important role. It can also help the Chinese police to become more efficient and better organized. A likely evolution could be that a greater emphasis will be placed on the "Police" role of this military body. This may be what is most needed at present.