2005-12-19 11:17:52Macoto Chen
作者專論：地方霸侯的藍色憂鬱
新任或連任的百里侯即將上路，他們（尤其是泛藍軍的地方霸侯）會有何種地方治理的危機，正是本文關注的焦點（又本篇短文業在2005.12.23登載為中國時報A15版時論廣場學者專論，該報標題仍是「地方霸侯的藍色憂鬱」）......又英文版則是Chen Chao-Chien,《Many local residents in for a case of the blues》, Taipei Times/Thursday, Dec 29, 2005,Page 8.（該主題則是2005.12.23中國時報A15版時論廣場學者專論「地方霸侯的藍色憂鬱」的英文版說明，另接受台北時報之編輯翻譯刊載之故）
實際上，地方治理的運作核心，不外乎就是「人」、「權」、「錢」等三項要素。然而，對多數地方霸侯而言，尤其是藍軍挑戰成功、重新執政的縣市（例如：台北縣、宜蘭縣、彰化縣、南投縣、嘉義市等），似乎即將面臨更為嚴重的「藍色憂鬱」，而值得吾人予以正視。
首就人事佈局來說，地方制度法第五十六條之修正固然擴大了新任百里侯的人事任命權，符合地方自治的發展趨勢。惟適用新法的地方霸侯卻也必需藉由卸除甚或轉調、降調原由永業文官所擔任的半數一級單位主管或機關首長之職缺，始得另以「機要人員進用方式」酬傭其輔選團隊、派系領袖或是不具文官資格的秀異精英。影響所及，地方文官體系的不滿與反彈，將會是新任百里侯的第一個難題。很不幸的是，此次有高達十七位藍軍地方霸侯必需面臨此項人事佈局與調整的嚴峻考驗，但卻僅有六位綠軍地方霸侯有著相同的困擾。
次就權限爭議而言，由於泛藍軍主政的百里侯版圖，如再包括台北市的話，業高達十八個之多；相關權限與業務也與中央高度重疊。因此，對中央執政的民進黨來說，「泛藍執政聯盟」對抗綠軍主政的「新葉爾欽效應」終將是個無法避免的「舊課題」（因為過去民進黨也曾經有「以地方包圍中央」的選舉戰略）。但倒過來說，中央的綠軍對泛藍執政聯盟的監督密度將會相對提高，導致中央地方之間夥伴關係的「府際治理」可能破局；影響所及，中央的執政資源也將不再平均挹注給藍軍執政的地方霸侯，而是反向加碼在南部七縣市（包括高雄市），進而形成資源分配的危機。
更重要的是，不僅是中央給泛藍執政聯盟的補助款終將會因此減少，再就府際財政的另項課題（即統籌分配稅款）而言，財政部擬重新合理分配統籌分配稅款的原定計畫勢必也將宣告停擺，屆時「巧婦難為無米之炊」的窘境正好又是會出現在藍軍地方霸侯的身上，進而加重「藍色憂鬱」的病情。相反的，中央所保留的特別統籌分配款（6%）應該也會選擇適當的時機形成給予南部綠軍七縣市的最佳奧援，造就「青（綠）出於藍，更勝於藍」的新「重南輕北」之政治圖貌。
最後，再以縣市負債的處理議題來說，藍軍主政的地方霸侯若是無法有效解決負債與償債的問題，則其奢談地方基礎建設的各項計畫（例如台北捷運環狀線之延長、再度申設古根漢的大夢等），在可預見的未來，也就是兩三年之內，勢將只是「紙上畫畫、牆上掛掛」的南柯一夢而已。蓋無論是地方制度法抑或預算法等相關法令都規定，地方霸侯擬增加支出的話，都必須先找到相對收入；然而，藍軍地方霸侯仰賴最深的補助款與統籌分配款日後都可能會實質的大幅減少，其又無法自行尋找地方自主財源並儘速清償龐大債務的話，那麼「藍色憂鬱」也會逐漸移轉至多數的縣市民身上。
總之，「藍色憂鬱」的地方霸侯現象正在預告藍軍主政的縣市民們：「我們的苦日子，才要開始呢」；相對的，「綠色執政、品質保證」的選舉承諾雖然不曾在中央出現過（因為民進黨自二○○○年執政以來，仍有施政不佳、弊案連連的敗筆），但在綠軍主政的縣市版圖上，卻是依然有機會成真的！
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2005.12.23 中國時報
地方霸侯的藍色憂鬱
陳朝建
地方治理的運作核心，不外乎就是「人」、「權」、「錢」三要素。然而，對多數地方霸侯而言，尤其是藍軍挑戰成功、重新執政的縣市（例如：台北縣、宜蘭縣、彰化縣、南投縣、嘉義市等），似乎即將面臨更為嚴重的「藍色憂鬱」，值得吾人正視。
首就人事布局來說，地方制度法第五十六條之修正固然擴大了新任百里侯的人事任命權，符合地方自治的發展趨勢。惟適用新法的地方霸侯卻也必須藉由卸除甚或轉調、降調原由永業文官所擔任的半數一級單位主管或機關首長之職缺，始得另以「機要人員進用方式」酬庸其輔選團隊、派系領袖或是不具文官資格的秀異菁英。影響所及，地方文官體系的不滿與反彈，將會是新任百里侯的第一個難題。很不幸的是，此次有高達十七位藍軍地方霸侯必須面臨此項人事布局與調整的嚴峻考驗，但卻僅有六位綠軍地方霸侯有著相同的困擾。
次就權限爭議而言，由於泛藍軍主政的百里侯版圖，若再包括台北市，業已高達十八個之多；相關權限與業務也與中央高度重疊。因此，對中央執政的民進黨來說，「泛藍執政聯盟」對抗綠軍主政的「新葉爾欽效應」終將是個無法避免的「舊課題」（因為過去民進黨也曾經有「以地方包圍中央」的選舉戰略）；但倒過來說，中央的綠軍對泛藍執政聯盟的監督密度將會相對提高，導致中央地方之間夥伴關係的「府際治理」可能破局；影響所及，中央的執政資源也將不再平均挹注給藍軍執政的地方霸侯，而是反向加碼在南部七縣市（包括高雄市），進而形成資源分配的危機。
更重要的是，不僅是中央給泛藍執政聯盟的補助款終將減少，再就府際財政的另項課題（即統籌分配稅款）而言，財政部擬重新合理分配統籌分配稅款的原定計畫勢必也將宣告停擺，屆時「巧婦難為無米之炊」的窘境正好又會出現在藍軍地方霸侯的身上，進而加重「藍色憂鬱」的病情。相反的，中央所保留的特別統籌分配款（六％）應該也會選擇在適當的時機，蔚為南部綠軍七縣市的最佳奧援，造就「青（綠）出於藍，更勝於藍」的新「重南輕北」政治圖貌。
最後，再以縣市負債的處理議題來說，藍軍主政的地方霸侯若是無法有效解決負債與償債的問題，則其奢談地方基礎建設的各項計畫（例如台北捷運環狀線之延長、再度申設古根漢的大夢等），在可預見的未來，也就是兩三年之內，勢將只是「紙上畫畫、牆上掛掛」的南柯一夢而已。蓋無論是地方制度法抑或預算法等相關法令都規定，地方霸侯擬增加支出的話，都必須先找到相對收入；然而，藍軍地方霸侯仰賴最深的補助款與統籌分配款日後都可能會實質地大幅減少，若又無法自行尋找地方自主財源並儘速清償龐大債務的話，那麼「藍色憂鬱」也會逐漸移轉至多數的縣市民身上。
總之，「藍色憂鬱」的地方霸侯現象正在預告藍軍主政的縣市民們：「我們的苦日子，才要開始呢」；相對的，「綠色執政、品質保證」的選舉承諾雖然不曾在中央出現過（因為民進黨自二○○○年執政以來，仍有施政不佳、弊案連連的敗筆），但在綠軍主政的縣市版圖上，卻是依然有機會成真的！（作者為銘傳大學公共事務學系助理教授）
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Many local residents in for a case of the blues
By Chen Chao-chien 陳朝建Thursday, Dec 29, 2005,Page 8
The core factors in local government operations are people, power and money. Most local leaders, especially in cities and counties where the pan-blue camp managed to regain power in the Dec. 3 elections -- such as Taipei, Ilan, Changhua and Nantou counties and Chiayi City -- are in for a serious dose of the "blues."
First of all, there is the issue of personnel. The amendment to Article 56 of the Local Government Act (地方制度法) extends the personnel-appointing powers of county commissioners and city mayors, in line with the trend toward greater local autonomy. The officials can use this law to fire, transfer or demote the bureaucrats in local government positions. Such people are replaced with campaign workers, factional leaders and others as a reward for their election help. Therefore, the first problem facing commissioners and mayors is dissatisfaction from local bureaucrats who may lose their jobs. Seventeen pan-blue county commissioners and mayors will be faced with the difficult issue of personnel adjustments and new staff appointments, while only six pan-green camp leaders will be faced with that problem.
Second, there will be controversies regarding the extent of local authority. In many cases, the authority and duties of local officials overlap with that of the central government. Since the pan-blue camp already holds Taipei City, its actually controls 18 regions on the nation’s political map.
This is a reversal of fortunes for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) because in the past, the DPP relied on using local governments to rein in the central government. Now, however, the governing DPP will intensify its monitoring of the pan-blue coalition, which could mean the end of the partnership between the central and local governments. The effect of that would be that the central government ends equal distribution of resources to pan-blue led local governments, and instead increases resources sent to the seven pan-green counties and cities in the south, thereby creating a political crisis.
It is not just the government’s subsidies to the pan-blue camp at the county and city level that will be squeezed. Another finance issue, the Ministry of Finance’s plan to find a reasonable way of redistributing tax funds, is certain to be halted. When that happens, local pan-blue leaders will not be able to accomplish anything, no matter how adept they are, and that will add to the blue camp’s worries. The special 6 percent tax quota kept by the central government provides an excellent way to support the green cities and counties in the south, thus redrawing the map to favor the south at the north’s expense.
Finally there is the issue of how cities and counties handle debt. If pan-blue local leaders are unable to resolve debt issues, all their big talk of building local infrastructure -- such as the extension of Taipei City’s MRT system -- will be but pipe dreams. Both the Local Government Act and the Budget Act (預算法) say that if local governments plan to increase expenditures, they must first find corresponding sources of income. The subsidies and tax fund allotments on which the pan-blue camp’s local leaders are most reliant may be drastically reduced. If they cannot find resources controlled by the local government itself and quickly pay off debts, the pan-blue camp’s problems will be gradually transferred to county and city residents.
For city and county residents, the worries of pan-blue local government leaders mean that days of hardship are coming. By contrast, although the central government did not make a promise that "satisfaction is guaranteed with green rule," this may still come true in the areas which remain under pan-green camp control.
Chen Chao-chien is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Affairs at Ming Chuan University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
實際上，地方治理的運作核心，不外乎就是「人」、「權」、「錢」等三項要素。然而，對多數地方霸侯而言，尤其是藍軍挑戰成功、重新執政的縣市（例如：台北縣、宜蘭縣、彰化縣、南投縣、嘉義市等），似乎即將面臨更為嚴重的「藍色憂鬱」，而值得吾人予以正視。
首就人事佈局來說，地方制度法第五十六條之修正固然擴大了新任百里侯的人事任命權，符合地方自治的發展趨勢。惟適用新法的地方霸侯卻也必需藉由卸除甚或轉調、降調原由永業文官所擔任的半數一級單位主管或機關首長之職缺，始得另以「機要人員進用方式」酬傭其輔選團隊、派系領袖或是不具文官資格的秀異精英。影響所及，地方文官體系的不滿與反彈，將會是新任百里侯的第一個難題。很不幸的是，此次有高達十七位藍軍地方霸侯必需面臨此項人事佈局與調整的嚴峻考驗，但卻僅有六位綠軍地方霸侯有著相同的困擾。
次就權限爭議而言，由於泛藍軍主政的百里侯版圖，如再包括台北市的話，業高達十八個之多；相關權限與業務也與中央高度重疊。因此，對中央執政的民進黨來說，「泛藍執政聯盟」對抗綠軍主政的「新葉爾欽效應」終將是個無法避免的「舊課題」（因為過去民進黨也曾經有「以地方包圍中央」的選舉戰略）。但倒過來說，中央的綠軍對泛藍執政聯盟的監督密度將會相對提高，導致中央地方之間夥伴關係的「府際治理」可能破局；影響所及，中央的執政資源也將不再平均挹注給藍軍執政的地方霸侯，而是反向加碼在南部七縣市（包括高雄市），進而形成資源分配的危機。
更重要的是，不僅是中央給泛藍執政聯盟的補助款終將會因此減少，再就府際財政的另項課題（即統籌分配稅款）而言，財政部擬重新合理分配統籌分配稅款的原定計畫勢必也將宣告停擺，屆時「巧婦難為無米之炊」的窘境正好又是會出現在藍軍地方霸侯的身上，進而加重「藍色憂鬱」的病情。相反的，中央所保留的特別統籌分配款（6%）應該也會選擇適當的時機形成給予南部綠軍七縣市的最佳奧援，造就「青（綠）出於藍，更勝於藍」的新「重南輕北」之政治圖貌。
最後，再以縣市負債的處理議題來說，藍軍主政的地方霸侯若是無法有效解決負債與償債的問題，則其奢談地方基礎建設的各項計畫（例如台北捷運環狀線之延長、再度申設古根漢的大夢等），在可預見的未來，也就是兩三年之內，勢將只是「紙上畫畫、牆上掛掛」的南柯一夢而已。蓋無論是地方制度法抑或預算法等相關法令都規定，地方霸侯擬增加支出的話，都必須先找到相對收入；然而，藍軍地方霸侯仰賴最深的補助款與統籌分配款日後都可能會實質的大幅減少，其又無法自行尋找地方自主財源並儘速清償龐大債務的話，那麼「藍色憂鬱」也會逐漸移轉至多數的縣市民身上。
總之，「藍色憂鬱」的地方霸侯現象正在預告藍軍主政的縣市民們：「我們的苦日子，才要開始呢」；相對的，「綠色執政、品質保證」的選舉承諾雖然不曾在中央出現過（因為民進黨自二○○○年執政以來，仍有施政不佳、弊案連連的敗筆），但在綠軍主政的縣市版圖上，卻是依然有機會成真的！
-----------------------------------
2005.12.23 中國時報
地方霸侯的藍色憂鬱
陳朝建
地方治理的運作核心，不外乎就是「人」、「權」、「錢」三要素。然而，對多數地方霸侯而言，尤其是藍軍挑戰成功、重新執政的縣市（例如：台北縣、宜蘭縣、彰化縣、南投縣、嘉義市等），似乎即將面臨更為嚴重的「藍色憂鬱」，值得吾人正視。
首就人事布局來說，地方制度法第五十六條之修正固然擴大了新任百里侯的人事任命權，符合地方自治的發展趨勢。惟適用新法的地方霸侯卻也必須藉由卸除甚或轉調、降調原由永業文官所擔任的半數一級單位主管或機關首長之職缺，始得另以「機要人員進用方式」酬庸其輔選團隊、派系領袖或是不具文官資格的秀異菁英。影響所及，地方文官體系的不滿與反彈，將會是新任百里侯的第一個難題。很不幸的是，此次有高達十七位藍軍地方霸侯必須面臨此項人事布局與調整的嚴峻考驗，但卻僅有六位綠軍地方霸侯有著相同的困擾。
次就權限爭議而言，由於泛藍軍主政的百里侯版圖，若再包括台北市，業已高達十八個之多；相關權限與業務也與中央高度重疊。因此，對中央執政的民進黨來說，「泛藍執政聯盟」對抗綠軍主政的「新葉爾欽效應」終將是個無法避免的「舊課題」（因為過去民進黨也曾經有「以地方包圍中央」的選舉戰略）；但倒過來說，中央的綠軍對泛藍執政聯盟的監督密度將會相對提高，導致中央地方之間夥伴關係的「府際治理」可能破局；影響所及，中央的執政資源也將不再平均挹注給藍軍執政的地方霸侯，而是反向加碼在南部七縣市（包括高雄市），進而形成資源分配的危機。
更重要的是，不僅是中央給泛藍執政聯盟的補助款終將減少，再就府際財政的另項課題（即統籌分配稅款）而言，財政部擬重新合理分配統籌分配稅款的原定計畫勢必也將宣告停擺，屆時「巧婦難為無米之炊」的窘境正好又會出現在藍軍地方霸侯的身上，進而加重「藍色憂鬱」的病情。相反的，中央所保留的特別統籌分配款（六％）應該也會選擇在適當的時機，蔚為南部綠軍七縣市的最佳奧援，造就「青（綠）出於藍，更勝於藍」的新「重南輕北」政治圖貌。
最後，再以縣市負債的處理議題來說，藍軍主政的地方霸侯若是無法有效解決負債與償債的問題，則其奢談地方基礎建設的各項計畫（例如台北捷運環狀線之延長、再度申設古根漢的大夢等），在可預見的未來，也就是兩三年之內，勢將只是「紙上畫畫、牆上掛掛」的南柯一夢而已。蓋無論是地方制度法抑或預算法等相關法令都規定，地方霸侯擬增加支出的話，都必須先找到相對收入；然而，藍軍地方霸侯仰賴最深的補助款與統籌分配款日後都可能會實質地大幅減少，若又無法自行尋找地方自主財源並儘速清償龐大債務的話，那麼「藍色憂鬱」也會逐漸移轉至多數的縣市民身上。
總之，「藍色憂鬱」的地方霸侯現象正在預告藍軍主政的縣市民們：「我們的苦日子，才要開始呢」；相對的，「綠色執政、品質保證」的選舉承諾雖然不曾在中央出現過（因為民進黨自二○○○年執政以來，仍有施政不佳、弊案連連的敗筆），但在綠軍主政的縣市版圖上，卻是依然有機會成真的！（作者為銘傳大學公共事務學系助理教授）
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Many local residents in for a case of the blues
By Chen Chao-chien 陳朝建Thursday, Dec 29, 2005,Page 8
The core factors in local government operations are people, power and money. Most local leaders, especially in cities and counties where the pan-blue camp managed to regain power in the Dec. 3 elections -- such as Taipei, Ilan, Changhua and Nantou counties and Chiayi City -- are in for a serious dose of the "blues."
First of all, there is the issue of personnel. The amendment to Article 56 of the Local Government Act (地方制度法) extends the personnel-appointing powers of county commissioners and city mayors, in line with the trend toward greater local autonomy. The officials can use this law to fire, transfer or demote the bureaucrats in local government positions. Such people are replaced with campaign workers, factional leaders and others as a reward for their election help. Therefore, the first problem facing commissioners and mayors is dissatisfaction from local bureaucrats who may lose their jobs. Seventeen pan-blue county commissioners and mayors will be faced with the difficult issue of personnel adjustments and new staff appointments, while only six pan-green camp leaders will be faced with that problem.
Second, there will be controversies regarding the extent of local authority. In many cases, the authority and duties of local officials overlap with that of the central government. Since the pan-blue camp already holds Taipei City, its actually controls 18 regions on the nation’s political map.
This is a reversal of fortunes for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) because in the past, the DPP relied on using local governments to rein in the central government. Now, however, the governing DPP will intensify its monitoring of the pan-blue coalition, which could mean the end of the partnership between the central and local governments. The effect of that would be that the central government ends equal distribution of resources to pan-blue led local governments, and instead increases resources sent to the seven pan-green counties and cities in the south, thereby creating a political crisis.
It is not just the government’s subsidies to the pan-blue camp at the county and city level that will be squeezed. Another finance issue, the Ministry of Finance’s plan to find a reasonable way of redistributing tax funds, is certain to be halted. When that happens, local pan-blue leaders will not be able to accomplish anything, no matter how adept they are, and that will add to the blue camp’s worries. The special 6 percent tax quota kept by the central government provides an excellent way to support the green cities and counties in the south, thus redrawing the map to favor the south at the north’s expense.
Finally there is the issue of how cities and counties handle debt. If pan-blue local leaders are unable to resolve debt issues, all their big talk of building local infrastructure -- such as the extension of Taipei City’s MRT system -- will be but pipe dreams. Both the Local Government Act and the Budget Act (預算法) say that if local governments plan to increase expenditures, they must first find corresponding sources of income. The subsidies and tax fund allotments on which the pan-blue camp’s local leaders are most reliant may be drastically reduced. If they cannot find resources controlled by the local government itself and quickly pay off debts, the pan-blue camp’s problems will be gradually transferred to county and city residents.
For city and county residents, the worries of pan-blue local government leaders mean that days of hardship are coming. By contrast, although the central government did not make a promise that "satisfaction is guaranteed with green rule," this may still come true in the areas which remain under pan-green camp control.
Chen Chao-chien is an assistant professor in the Department of Public Affairs at Ming Chuan University.
Translated by Perry Svensson