我在學校借的書
美國白皮書對中國論述
香港和台灣專題約佔2頁半
1993和2005的三方關係到底有什麼進步?!


Taiwan: Developments and Implications

The United States has important economic, cultural, and other ties to Taiwan, as well as obligations under U.S. domestic law as specified in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Since normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC in 1979, Taiwan’s domestic political system has liberalized considerably, and its role in the world economy has expanded enormously, with the island holding about $90 billion in foreign exchange. These changes, however, do not invalidate the core elements in American policy since the 1972 Shanghai Communique and the 1978-79 “normalization” agreement with Beijing. These elements are: U.S. recognition that the government of the PRC is the sole legal government of china, and that within this context the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan; that the United States acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of China; and that the interests of the United States require the relationship between Beijing and Taipei to be resolved peacefully (by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait without U.S mediation or pressure). Within these parameters, however, it is appropriate to take full account of Taiwan’s capacity to contribute to the solution of regional and global problems, to secure American economic interests there, and to acknowledge the genuine economic and political achievements of Taiwan’s people.

In recent years, Taiwan has emerged as one of the world’s top 15 trading entities and the United States’ sixth largest trade partner. The island has one of the world’s lowest debt levels and has sustained an annual rate of real per capita GNP growth of about 9 percent for 30 years which resulted in a per capita GNP of $10,196 in 1992. Taiwan is now embarking on a strategy that emphasizes both growth and environmental protection and includes an ambitions $300 billion Six-Year Development Plan designed to modernize its infrastructure and make the island a competitive center for business, finance, trade, and transport in the region, although meeting the Plan’s targets may require more than 6 years.

American interests in and connections to Taiwan are extensive. Over 33,000 Taiwan students and scholars are studying in the United States, over half of Taipei’s cabinet officials were educated in the United States, about 35 states have signed sister state agreements with Taiwan, 20 states have trade offices in Taipei, and approximately 600 American companies have offices in Taiwan. Moreover, progress has been made on reducing Taiwan’s large trade surplus with the United States, from $18 billion in 1987 to less than $9 billion in 1992.
Since 1987, Taiwan has made remarkable progress in moving away form authoritarian government. Since that year, when Chiang ching-kuo announced that martial law would be lifted and opposition parties allowed, Taiwan’s internal political system has experienced very rapid change. Taiwan is in the midst of a peaceful transition toward a democratic system, although the road already traversed has been rough and the route ahead has numerous potholes. Opening the political process has already produced a two-party system, with some 60 minor parties relegated to the sideline; the dominance of the Kuomintang (KMT) has been maintained, although it is diminishing. In the election of 1989, the chief opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won 28 percent of the popular vote and the KMT 60 percent. In the 1991 National Assembly election, the KMT won 71 percent of the popular vote and the DPP 23 percent. The DPP campaigning on a platform of Taiwan independence, suffered a considerable setback as a large majority of the citizens apparently decided to pot for stability and slow formal change, rather than formal independence now. In the December 1992 elections for the first democratically elected Legislative Yuan, the KMT won only 53 percent of the popular vote, the DPP 31 percent, and independents 14 percent. Name recognition and constituent services garnered the most votes, while domestic concerns for stability, competent government, and improved social services were the dominant issues, though “independence” issues were scarcely below the surface. The DPP’s capture of nearly one-third of the seats, together with intensified factional differences within the KMT, may portend a more contentious, less predictable political future for Taiwan.

The principal mission of Taiwan’s current National Assembly, elected in December 1991, is to revise the constitution. One of the most contentious issues of the constitutional revision meeting is whether or not the president should be directly elected by the people, or , as in the past , by the National Assembly.

Turning to the future, Taiwan officials have forecast a 7 percent annual economic growth rate through 1996, having achieved 6.11 percent in 1992’s depressed world economy, and it is probable that the growth rate for the decade of the 1990s will approach that rate. Were growth rates in the 6-7 percent range to be sustained, this would give Taiwan a GNP of $250-$270 billion in 1997 and $330 billion in the year 2000.

With respect to its regional role, Taiwan sees its main trade competitors as Japan and South Korea. Taiwan is the largest or second-largest foreign investor in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as being the largest external investor in Fujian Province on China’s mainland. Taiwan remained in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) when the PRC entered the organization in 1986 by acquiescing to its designation as “Taipei, China.” Moreover, Taiwan is a member of three other important regional economic organizations, the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, a ministerial-level group.

These domestic and regional accomplishments have brought Taiwan to the point where its people universally want to play a larger role in global, multilateral organization. Taipei applied in 1990 to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as “ The Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matshu” (thereby sidestepping issues of sovereignty). In September 1992 Taiwan was granted observer status by the GATT pending approval of their application by a GATT working group and the successful conclusion of bilateral negotiations between Taiwan and selected GATT members. The Committee supports Taiwan’s admission.

In addition to the United Nations, Taiwan has expressed interest in playing a role in the World Bank and the IMF. One possible option would be the creation of a separate Taiwan/Hong Kong lending window at the World Bank or the IMF for use by third world countries as required, including debt reduction and debt services. Another possibility for Taiwan to assume international economic responsibilities according to its growing economic importance would be to open participation by Taiwan in the sectoral committees and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), since Taiwan cannot become a full member of the OECD. These committees are policy forums concerned with economic growth and financial stability, the promotion of free trade, and aid to developing countries.

The gap between Taiwan’s global economic power and its second –class diplomatic status has become increasingly obvious. The DPP has attacked the KMT for maintaining its policy of eventual reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, with the mainstream of the DPP arguing for an internationally sanctioned plebiscite of the people of Taiwan to give them an opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination. Some in the DPP argue that the time has come to proclaim de jure independence and simultaneously seek a seat in the United Nations as the “ Republic of Taiwan” The bulk of the KMT argues that the PRC would veto entry into the UN, that few of the world’s countries would recognize an independent Taiwan, and that the PRC would react by employing force or economic coercion. The election of December 1992, however, reveals disagreement within the KMT over whether the government in Taipei should abandon its claim to be the legitimate government of all China.

In the future the KMT government will continue to try to upgrade its international relationships, pushing as far as it can go, and the DPP opposition will attack it for not doing enough. The rising influence of Taiwanese (both within and outside the KMT) is a democratizing system will ensure increasing pressures for a more clear-cut international identity for Taiwan.

Taiwan’s primary objectives in its policies toward the mainland are to enhance its prosperity and to protect its security, which in part has been maintained through a continuous effort to modernize its defense forces by acquiring weapons and technology from abroad. Hence, Taipei has proposed conditions for reunification far different from Beijing’s “one country, tow systems” formulation. Taipei’s proposal includes a democratic , free-market system on the mainland, an end to PRC threats to use force, and cessation of PRC attempts to isolate the island internationally. At the same time, by opposing independence and committing Taiwan to eventual reunification, Taipei thus far has sought to ease tension with Beijing and allay the fears of the PRC’s elders that Taiwan is drifting toward independence.

A more important influence on Beijing’s attitudes than Taipei’s pronouncements on eventual unification has been the expanding network of economic and cultural links between Taiwan and the mainland. Indeed, Taiwan has established a “non-governmental” counterpart in China, the Association for Relations Across the Strait. As noted in the discussion of the Chinese triangular economy, economic cooperation has been growing rapidly, despite some worries among Taiwan authorities that increasing economic ties of investment and trade make the island vulnerable to political blackmail by the mainland. Nonetheless, as long as Beijing maintains its open policy and economic reform, trade and investment probably will grow briskly for the remainder of the decade. At the same time, there probably will be little or no progress toward political reunification.

The careful balance of American policy toward China and Taiwan is sustainable only as long as domestic forces in both Taiwan and on the mainland do not depart too far from their current policies. The ultimate question with which American policy may eventually have to come to terms, and for which the policy of the last two decades has no clear answer, is what happens if Taiwan declares de jure independence or Beijing’s leaders act precipitously? The United States must work to avoid this contingency. In addition, the United States must also strive to keep a delicate balance in its policy, a balance between the requirements of the “three communiqués” and the TRA. The late 1992 approvals to sell F-16s and antisubmarine helicopters to Taiwan are testing Washington’s ability to walk this tightrope. The U.S. government should suggest and others should state clearly, to the Taiwanese that the autonomy that is not enjoyed would be jeopardized if the people of Taiwan declared de jure independence.